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In the Shadow of Soft Law: The
Handling of Corporate Social
Responsibility Disputes Under the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises
Leyla Davarnejad*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2000 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines)
were thoroughly reviewed and transformed into one of today's most comprehensive Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives.' The Guidelines' implementation mechanism sets them apart as the most developed governmental code
of conduct for CSR. The number of countries adhering to the Guidelines continues to grow. Of the forty-two countries that currently adhere to the guidelines,
thirty-four are member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and eight are non-member countries. 3 Hence, the
* The author is a Ph.D. candidate at the Ruhr-University Law School, Germany, where she has
worked for five years as a teaching and research associate. This article is a shorter version of her master thesis, which she completed as a research fellow in the Stanford Program in International Legal
Studies (SPILS) at Stanford Law School. The author would like to thank the NCP and OECD officials
for participating in this study. Also, the author would like to thank the Stanford Law faculty who
graciously offered their time and insights over the course of this study. In particular, the author is
indebted to Professor Allen S. Weiner for his invaluable support.
1. This study is based on the 2000 Review of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_2649_34889_48024409_I-I_I_,00.htmi
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. In the original version enacted in 1976, the Guidelines represented a
code of conduct that addressed multinational enterprises. See Daniel J. Plaine, The OECD Guidelines
for MultinationalEnterprises, II INT'L L. J. 339-346 (1977)(for a comment on the original version). In
the years 1984 and 1991, OECD released two more revisions on particular questions. See The OECD
Guidelines
for
Multinational
Enterprises:
Decision
of
the
Council,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3746,en_2649 34889_ 1933095_ I _I _I ,00.html.
The
most
recent update of the Guidelines was completed in May 2011 when this study was already completed.
See 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3746,en_.2649_34889_44086753III1 1,00.html. The 2011
revision is not comprehensive like the 2000 review of the Guidelines. Those changes are referred to in
this article.
2. Compare The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy of the ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.ilo.org/
empent/Publications/WCMS 094386/lang--en/index.htm with Ten principles of the U.N. Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.
3. The 34 OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. The eight
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Guidelines have raised high expectations due to their governmental character,
number of participating countries, and implementation mechanism. Taking into
account the voluntary or non-enforceable character of other CSR initiatives, the
Guidelines seemed to have the potential of being more "effective" and "relevant." 4
But this early promise has dimmed somewhat in recent years. Some of the
criticisms are coming from civil society and scholars who focus on the Guidelines' multilateral dispute resolution mechanism known as specific instances.5
Specific instances govern individual cases involving alleged corporate noncompliance with the Guidelines.6 Many consider government observance of corporate compliance with the Guidelines as either ineffective 7 or "highly uneven."8
Their criticisms are based on the notion that CSR standards are not enforceable"soft law," as qualified in international law-and therefore regarded sceptically.
For these kinds of norms, an implementation provision is crucial to promote compliance.
Although these criticisms are on point in principle; however, it is unclear how
government agencies, known as National Contact Points (NCPs), actually handle
CSR issues presented in specific instances because a comprehensive and systematic study of specific instances is missing. The purpose of this study is to fill this
gap by analyzing the governmental handling of CSR disputes under the Guidelines.
The underlying assumption of this research is the Guidelines' (1) ambiguous
and vague content, (2) legal construction, (3) and legal commitment have led to
uneven expectations and multiple approaches to this unique dispute resolution
mechanism. There is not a consensus among NCPs on CSR commitments and
how to apply CSR standards. In other words, compliance and implementation of
the Guidelines have different meanings for NCPs because of the Guidelines' soft
law nature and CSR content. As a result, one NCP approaches companies considerably different than another NCP, which could ultimately undermine the impact
of the Guidelines.
This socio-legal study undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the various
practices NCPs apply to solve CSR disputes during specific instances. It does so
in four parts, starting with an outline of the legal background of the CSR debate
non-member countries that have adopted the OECD Guidelines are: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Latvia,
Lithuania, Morocco, Peru and Romania.
4. See for a good reflection of these expectations, see Joris Oldenziel, The 2000 review of the
OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises: a new code of conduct?, available at
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_1870/?searchterm=guidelines.
5. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34.
6. Id.
7. OECD Watch's September 2005 report, Five Years On: A review of the OECD Guidelines and
NCPs, was critical of the NCPs' haphazard approach to casework. See Five Years On: A review of the
OECD Guidelines and NCPs, OECD WATCH, http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_2973/.
In March 2007, the European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs called on the
European Commission and Member States to: "[I]mprove the functioning of [NCPs] in particular in
dealing with specific instances raised concerning alleged violations throughout operations and supply
chains of European companies worldwide." See European ParliamentResolution of 13 March 2007 on
Corporate Social Responsibility, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-2007-0062&language=EN.
8. U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie,
Mapping InternationalStandards of Responsibility and Accountabilityfor Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) at 15 50.
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and movement in Part II. Part Ell examines the construction and content of the
Guidelines. Also, Part III explores the soft law nature debate and how it shapes the
NCPs' commitment and implementation of the Guidelines.
In Part IV, the empirical findings of this study are presented to illuminate
how the soft law nature of the Guidelines shapes the NCPs' commitment and implementation of the Guidelines. The empirical findings consist of a content analysis of fifty-seven published final statements of the NCPs reporting on specific
instances. Also, the findings include twenty-five NCPs' responses to a survey,
which was addressed to all forty-two NCPs, and interviews with five NCP officials, and one OECD official. The empirical methods were combined in order to
collect and analyze data in terms of the procedural practices and outcomes of this
dispute system. In addition, Part IV questions how NCPs understand their role and
function in handling CSR disputes and the goals they aim to achieve.
Finally, Part V consists of concluding remarks about this dispute system
while providing a brief update and forecast about the 2011 Guidelines.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY DEBATE AND MOVEMENT
The relevance of the Guidelines within the continually growing field of CSR
initiatives can only be understood in the context of the minimal legal obligation
requiring business entities to respect human rights, social norms, and environmental standards. This legal landscape has led to the rise of CSR, an international
policy issue that calls on corporations to be profitable in a sustainable way by not
harming human beings or the environment. 9 The United Nations (UN) defines
sustainable development as a "development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 10
In today's globalized world, multinational enterprises (MNEs)" are under
almost no international legal obligation to respect human rights, core labor standards, or environmental norms.12 These global players - who, can avoid controls
and regulations imposed by domestic law due to their mobility - are not obliged to
9. This broad definition is chosen because it seems to bring the issue to a head. However, there is
no generally accepted definition or concept of CSR. See CHIP Prrrs, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, 5-32 (2009) (for an overview of debates and issues).
10. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development:
Our Common Future, Mar. 20, 1987, AIRES/42/187, available at http://www.un-documents.net/ocf02.htm. This is the most widely used definition for sustainability and sustainable development.
11. Synonyms for MNEs are multinational or transnational corporations. According to the most
common working definition these enterprises engage in foreign direct investment and own or control in
some way value-added activities in more than one country. See JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M.
LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3 (2008) (referring to OECD,
UNCTAD, business, and scholars using this definition).
12. Core labor standards are the basic labor standards as classified by the International Labor Organization (ILO), like the elimination of forced and compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor,
freedom of association and the right to collecting bargaining. See The ILO Declarationon Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,

INTERNATIONAL

LABOUR ORGANIZATION,

available at

http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang--en/index.htm, and eight ILO core labor standard
conventions, also known as the fundamental human rights conventions. Conventions and Recommendations, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.ilo.org/globaVstandards/
introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm.
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respect international law because they are not (or are only partial) subjects of international law.13 Despite MNEs' increasing economic activities, they are not
subject to sufficient international regulation and control-a legal situation that is
often described as a "legal vacuum" 4 or an "accountability gap."' 5 While investment treaties and customary international law protect corporate assets, there are
few legally binding obligations to respect human rights, the environment, and
other societal concerns. In recent years, demands have been made to integrate
investor obligations into investment treaties as a means of promoting the rights
and the obligations of investors' 6- a demand that previously arose during the
early 1970s.17
At that time, demands for the legal control of MNEs were made based on the
concern that MNEs' growing economic and political power might pose a risk to
developing countries and their sovereignty. As such, the international community expressed a demand for a "new international economic order" to protect the
interests of developing countries.19 Since the 1990s, human rights concerns have
predominantly led states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and experts on international law to consider how to regulate MNEs.
In addition to the human rights responsibility and accountability of MNEs, the
need for a broader corporate responsibility has been a much discussed issue,
which led to the rise of social corporate responsibility.20 To date, there has not
13. The question of whether MNEs are obliged to respect international law is a controversial one.
"In principle, corporations of municipal law do not have international legal personality." See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 66 (2008); see generally MALCOLM N.

SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 250 (2008) (characterizing this issue as an "open question").
14. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilitiesfor Corporationsat InternationalLaw, 44 VA. J. INT'L LAW 931, 935 (2004).
15. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporationsand Human Rights, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 54 (2002) (stating the concern about "the gap between the economic reality and
the legal tools available to hold corporate groups accountable for their actions").
16. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (July 2, 2003) 56 (noting that such an approach
"examines what complementary measures are needed to ensure an appropriate balance of rights and
obligations between States and towards investors, bearing in mind States responsibilities under human
rights law").
17. For a comparison of the initiatives of the ICC, OECD, ILO and the code of conduct debate of the
1970s, see generally A. Fatouros, On the Implementation of International Codes of Conduct: an
Analysis of Future Experience Symposium: Codes of Conductfor TransnationalCorporations,30 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 941 (1980); Norbert Horn, InternationalRules for Multinational Enterprises: The
ICC, OECD, and ILO Initiatives, 30 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 923 (1980); Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporationsand InternationalCodes of Conduct: A Study of the Relationship between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development Symposium: Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations,30 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 903-922 (1980-1981); Timothy W. Stanley, International Codes of Conduct for MNC's: A Skeptical View of the Process Symposium: Codes of Conduct
for TransnationalCorporations,30 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 973-1008 (1980-1981).
18. See Peter Fischer, Transnational Enterprises, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW, 921-926 (924) (R. Bernhardt ed. 2000); Karl P. Sauvant & Elton R. Lanier, Host-Country Councils: Concept and Legal Aspects, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, 341 - 405 (Norbert Horn ed. 1980).
19. See U.N. Resolution on the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/9556 (May 1, 1974), available at http://www.undocuments.net/s6r320 I.htm.
20. See LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1- 15 (Menno
T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zariel, eds., 2000); CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Istemi Demirag, ed. 2005).
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been a consistent and generally accepted definition of the CSR concept because its
content and legal forms are matters of debate.2' In terms of content, the scope of
CSR may comprise of any subject beyond human rights, labor, and environmental
issues that have any relevance to the broader themes of sustainability, including
issues as consumer protection and corruption.
Not only are the dimensions and subject matter of CSR manifold, there is also
debate about whether CSR standards have or ought to have a hard law nature. 22
CSRs can be legally binding or voluntary, depending on whether MNEs are bound
by domestic law or whether they respond to societal expectations. The normative
quality and significance of internationally agreed CSR standards are often unclear,
however.
It is important to note that when discussing CSRs' international initiatives and
their legal quality, a distinction should be made between governmental, nongovernmental/private, and multi-stakeholder acts. The Guidelines represent a governmental initiative because only the adhering countries can determine how to
change and implement the Guidelines. In addition, representatives on the part of
civil society-in particular business, trade unions, and NGOs-are consulted concerning all aspects of the Guidelines, including their implementation. However,
the Guidelines have to be distinguished from multi-stakeholder initiatives, which
are very common in the context of CSR. In terms of these initiatives various private actors cooperate and determine their form and content, sometimes with and
sometimes without the contribution of governments. 23
III. CONSTRUCTION, CONTENT, COMMITMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE GUIDELINES
A. The Content: A Broad CSR Scope and a Broad Definition of MNEs
The Guidelines' personal, topical, and territorial scopes are quite comprehensive. During the review procedure, drafters exerted substantial effort to increase
the relevance of the Guidelines while enlarging the applicable areas.
First, the Guidelines avoid the scholarly and practical debates surrounding the
definition of MNEs by stating that a concrete definition is not necessary. 24Included within this vague category are:
companies or other entities established in more than one country and so
linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While
one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the en-

21. Synonyms for CSR are corporate responsibility, corporate societal responsibility, and corporate
citizenship.
22. Jennifer A. Zerk, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILrrY: LIMITATIONS
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (2006).

23. See Prrrs,supra note 9, at 199.
24. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 12,

3.
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terprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another.
25

This sweeping definition of MNEs includes ownership of private, state, and
mixed natures. All entities within MNEs (parent companies and/or local entities)
are addressees and "the different entities are expected to co-operate and to assist
one another to facilitate observance of the Guidelines." 26 As such, all kinds of
corporations are addressees under the Guidelines.
Second, the Guidelines provide numerous topics that are considered CSR subjects. The range of areas comprises of diverse interests such as: (1) human rights, 27
(2) disclosure of information, 28 (3) labor and industrial relations, (4) environment,
(5) anti-bribery, (6) consumer protection, (7) science and technology, (8) competi29
tion, (9) and taxation. In this connection, fostering the principle of sustainability
is necessary while highlighting the "links among economic, social, and environmental progress are a key means for furthering the goal of sustainable development."3U Commentary in the Guidelines refers to international initiatives of other
international organizations like the International Labor Organization (ILO), and
other OECD initiatives in order to solidify the meaning of the chosen CSR topics. 3 1 Regarding corporations' responsibility to respect human rights, the Guidelines explain that respecting human rights is primarily an obligation of states, but:
where corporate conduct and human rights intersect enterprises do play a
role, and and thus MNEs are encouraged to respect human rights, not
only in their dealings with employees, but also with respect to others affected by their activities, in a manner that is consistent with host governments' international obligations and commitments. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights obligations of the
government concerned are of particular relevance in this regard.32
Hence, the addressees and content of the Guidelines are extensive and - as will be
explained further - underpinned by a universal territorial scope.
Third, the governments of the adhering countries address the Guidelines to
MNEs operating in their country, but ask MNEs to respect human rights wherever
they operate. The Guidelines explain the necessity of this extension by simply
referring to the worldwide business practice of MNEs. In the CSR context, this
territorial extension is especially important because the most severe issues occur
in developing countries-not in the territory of the industrialized OECD member

25. Id.
26. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 12, 13.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id. at 15. Disclosure of information means in this context that MNEs shall "ensure that timely,
regular, reliable and relevant information" is disclosed regarding their activities. Id.
29. See generally OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, pt. 1.
30. See id. at 39.
31. See id. at 43 (for references to numerous ILO acts).
32. See id. at 39.
33. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 12, 2 ("Governments adhering to the Guidelines encourage the enterprises operating on their territories to observe the Guidelines wherever they operate").
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countries. However, it is also highlighted in the Guidelines that compliance must
take place while obeying the domestic law of host countries. 34
In sum, the broad personal, topical, and territorial scopes assure that corporations have to respect the Guidelines.
B. The Legal Construction: Embedded In an "Investment Package"
The Guidelines can only be understood in the context of other legal instruments, which taken together constitute a combined "package of investment measures." 35 The Guidelines have been included in the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (Declaration), which represents3 6
one of the three "legal instruments" of the OECD on international investment and
trade in services. 37 However, the Declaration is not among the legal acts of the
OECD enumerated in Article 5 of the OECD Convention. The enumerated acts
are: (1) binding decisions (lit. a); (2) recommendations (lit. b); and (3) agreements
(lit. c).3 8 The Declaration is considered to be one of the most important "legal
instruments" of the OECD because it is considered a constitutional part of the
OECD "acquis" and is thus non-negotiable-that is, the Declaration has to be
39
accepted by a membership candidate in the accession process.
The Declaration - only two pages long - is included in the opening pages of
the Guidelines, followed by the CSR Code of Conduct. This Code of Conductwhich are essentially the Guidelines addressed to MNEs-is about seventeen
pages long and organized as parts. In "Part H," the implementation procedures of
the Guidelines are explained in seven pages. The third and final part includes the
commentaries on both the Guidelines and the implementation procedures, and is
about twenty-five pages long. A note by the OECD Secretariat states that the
commentaries shall provide information but they are neither a part of the Guidelines (Part I) nor their implementation procedure (Part II). Instead, the implementation procedures are issued as a decision of the OECD Council and are therefore
binding on OECD members. 40
Among the various elements that constitute and accompany the Guidelines,
the implementation procedures are the only part whose legally binding quality is
definite and incontestable. Regarding the meaning and interpretation of the Guide34. Id. at 12.
35. Leyla Davarnejad, The Impact of Non-State Actors on the International Law Regime of Corporate Social Responsibility: Blessing or Curse?, in NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS 52 (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert, eds. 2010).
36. OECD Legal Instruments on International Investment and Trade in Services, OECD, available
at http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_2649_34887_1932962_I_1 11,00.html. The OECD
is an International Organization known for its huge provision of soft law. This may be one explanation
for the terminological confusion. Furthermore, the OECD Convention was never reviewed after 1960
and seems not to cover all kinds of "legally relevant" acts anymore.
37. OECD Legal Instruments on International Investment and Trade in Services, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en 2649_34887 1932962_1_1_1 ,00.html.
38. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Dec. 14, 1960),
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1915847-1_-I_-,00.html.
39. OECD Council, The Concept of the OECD "Acquis" 30 (Mar. 15, 2007)(document on file with
OECD).
40. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, art. 5(a),
http://www.oecd.org/documentfl/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1915847_11-I_1,00.html.
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lines as CSR standards, it is important to note that they were enacted as an annex
to a Declaration, which aims to promote international investment. MNEs are the
main providers of investment. The governments adhering to the Guidelines are the
"source of most of the world's direct investment flows and home to most multinational enterprises." 41 Therefore, the Guidelines shall also "serve" the promotion of
international investment. In sum, it is important to consider when thinking about
the implementation of the Guidelines that the promotion of international investment is the broader context and policy framework of the CSR initiative.
C. The Legal Commitment: DebatedDue To Soft Law Quality
Because the Guidelines are not an enforceable governmental code of conduct,
they are considered "soft law" from the international law point of view. 42 Soft law
in general-and codes of conduct addressed to MNEs in particular-are often
viewed with skepticism because of their assumed "voluntary" character and their
alleged lack of (or ambiguous) effectiveness. According to the Guidelines' own
terminology, the Guidelines are "voluntary," 43 "non-binding,"" and "not legally
enforceable." 45 This terminological confusion (legally non-binding/voluntary and
legally enforceable) reflects the broader scholarly debate on the term and normative nature of soft law-which also invokes the disagreement about whether corporations should comply with the Guidelines.
Since the beginning of the soft law debate in the 1970s, scholars have engaged in lively debates about the nature of law, (i.e., the sources of international
law), and the elements which determine whether a norm is legally binding or
not.46 As one would expect, the majority of public international law experts deny
that this group of norms has a legally binding nature. 47 The only point on which
41. Implementation of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/43/0,3746,en 2649_34889_20747311I111,00.html.
42. Alternative terms used to refer to "soft law" are: nonbinding/non-legal/voluntary/politicall
administrative agreements, guidelines, resolutions, declarations or standards, gentlemen's agreements.
Though there are different kinds of and terms used for acts qualified as "soft law," "soft law" is the
most common one and is therefore used here. However, many scholars either do not use this term or
expressly avoid the term "soft law" since they regard it as confusing. See, e.g. JACK L. GOLDSMITH &
ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81-2 (2005) (arguing that the term is misleading
because such acts are not legally binding).
43. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 12, 1.
44. Id. at 43, 20.
45. Id. at 12 1.
46. Lord McNair was the first to use the term "soft law," but he did not provide an explicit definition
of the term. Consequently, there are mainly two positions on "soft law's" definition in legal scholarship: 1) those who interpret the term "hard law" and "soft law" as synonyms for lex lata und lex
feranda (e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of soft law, 65 NOR. J. INT'L L. 173 n. 32 (1996)) 2) and
those who believe Lord McNair intended to define "soft law" as the "principles" in public international
law (see e.g., CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING, 76, 81 (Antonio Cassese &
Joseph H. Weiler, eds. 1988). This reference to Lord McNair is made by Christine M. Chinkin, Normative Development in the InternationalLegal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 21-42 (D. Shelton, ed. 2000).
47. Compare the soft law debate only: Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding
International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 300 (1977); IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SOFT LAW, 173-246 (1980); Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms
- A Meaningful Distinction in InternationalRelations?, 11 NOR. J. INT'L L. 65-95 (1980); Chris
Ingelse, Soft Law?, 20 POL. YB. INT'L. L. 75, 77 (1993); Fritz Munch, Non-Binding Agreements, in
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there is agreement is that soft law is not one of the sources of international law
enumerated in Art. 38 para. I ICJ Statute. At its core, this debate in international
law is one of general legal theory, which questions whether enforceability is an
essential element of law. In this regard, the dispute seems classical or even antiquated.48
But this question of compliance with international law is a difficult one because an overarching "sovereign" does not exist to compel compliance with international norms. Furthermore, instead of trying to define soft law positively, it is
generally defined negatively by reference to so-called "hard law" (a definition of
"hard law" is also avoided by those using the term "soft law"). This is particularly
counter-productive because the concept of "hard law" itself is problematic. That
is, the term suggests an unrealistically pure and clear idea of law regarding its
dimensions of precision, obligation, and delegation.4 9
The soft law debate has become confused and may have stagnated because
the participants in the debate have a tendency to talk past each other. Because
there is no generally accepted definition of soft law, the term is used as a catchall
concept for a heterogeneous group of norms.50 In other words, the acts included
under the umbrella of "soft law" range from moral or political commitments to
legal ones. The scholars criticising soft law - while unfortunately categorically
denying a normative quality without any differentiation among the regulations are often afraid diluting international law and its credibility.51 But despite these
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 608, 611 (Rudolf Bernhardt,
ed.,1997); Alberto Szdkely, Non-Binding Commitments: A Commentary on the Softening of International Law Evidenced in the Environmental Field, in U.N., INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF THE
MAX

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY - VIEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,

173, 191-192

(1997); Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 901-913 (1999); Hartmut Hilgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499,
511 (1999).
48. See generally Immanuel Kant, Methaphysik Der Sitten, in IMMANUEL KANT: WERKE IN 12
BANDEN (1977); Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, GrundlinienDer PhilosophieDes Rechts, in GEORG

WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL: WERKE (1979); Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Einleitung in die
Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, in REINE RECHTSLEHRE, STUDIENAUSGABE DER 1. AUFLAGE
(Matthias Jestaedt ed., 2008), Max Weber, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft. Grundrfi, der Verstehenden
Soziologie, in STUDIENAUSGABE, (Johannes Winckelmann ed., 1980) (while Weber (written between
1909 and 1914 and published posthumous in 1921) and Kelsen (in 1934) argued that sanctions were
constitutive elements for law, Kant (in 1797) and Hegel (in 1820) expounded, vice versa, the problcms
of legitimization of sanctions since sanctions limit freedom though law shall ensure freedom).
49. JOHN J. KIRTON & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK (eds.), HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAw: VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 8-9 (2004) (arguing that
the relationship is rather a "continuum" than a dichotomy) Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard
and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421-456 (2000) (providing a differentiation
of the three dimensions (precision, obligation, and delegation which indicate whether an act can be
qualified as hard law).
50. Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Low in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L
ORG. 421-456 (2000) (providing a typology and general analysis of sofi law).
51. Robert Jennings, The Discipline of InternationalLaw, speech at the 5 7 t' conference of the ILA,
in 57 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. 622, 632 (1976) (warning that public international law would be "sub-

merged under the rival empires of papers emanating from international assemblies"); Oscar Schachter,
Recent Trends in InternationalLow Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (1989) (dating back the
beginning of the majority of European and North American international law scholars in disfavour of
soft law to Jennings speech while highlighting the historical circumstances: the soft law debate ignited
due to the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly claiming for a New International Economic
Order).
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understandable concerns, it has to be acknowledged that states prefer to enact
measures qualified as soft law compared to treaties due to their flexibility. 52
Therefore, soft law can be found in any particular area of international law such as
international environmental law,5 3 human rights law,- international economic
law, 5 and agreements regulating arms control. 6 Despite the somewhat ambiguous
terminology57 and the disadvantages of soft law when compared to treaties, there
is a widespread consensus on the function of soft law that it may prove useful in
8
developing, interpreting, and clarifying international law.5
Concerning the Guidelines, this function could be true because the CSR concept is a relatively new policy. 59 The meaning of the Guidelines' concrete obligations and binding force are debated and still in the process of development. Thorough examinations of soft law compliance are needed" although some recent soft
law studies focus on soft law compliance.6 1 In particular, effective implementation
mechanisms are considered crucial and will also be discussed throughout this
article. Due to their complex legal construction, these CSR standards represent a
52. See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, InternationalSoft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANAL. 171225 (2010) (providing four explanations for why states use soft law: to coordinate "games in which the
existence of a focal point is enough to generate compliance," "loss avoidance theory" while avoiding
the higher sanctions of hard law, according to the "delegation theory" states use soft law when they are
uncertain which rules may be desirable in the future and last but not least: according to the "concept of
international common law" states give international institutions the authority to make non-binding
interpretations of binding rules as a way around that states must consent on legal rules); see generally
Kirton, supra note 49 (providing many contributions which explain how and why soft law can work in
support of economically, ecologically, and socially sustainable global governance); Charles Lipson,
Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991) (highlighting the
easier/quicker negotiation of informal agreements in comparison to legal ones, their higher flexibility,
their lower requirement of information, their avoidance of publicity and lower commitment). The
Federal Republic of Germany has e.g. regulated in its internal rules of procedure addressed to federal
ministries that the agreement of soft law regulations in foreign affairs have priority with regard to
treaties (Gemeinsame Geschiftsordnung der Bundesministerien, § 72 I1 (Sept. 1, 2000)).
53. See e.g. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (August 12, 1992).
54. See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71 U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Ist plen. Mtg., U.N. DOC A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948).
55. See e.g. Ignaz Seidl-Hohneveldern, International Economic Soft Law, 163 RECUEIL DES COUR
173, 195 (1979); see generally Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft InternationalLaw of Exchange
Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983); Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law:
Strengthening InternationalBanking Supervisions, 39 VA.J.INT'L L. 1 (1998).
56. See e.g., General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 I.L.M. 75,
110, art. 4, 5 (1996); see also Guido den Dekker, The Law of Arms Control and Sub-Regional Arms
Control in the Former Yugoslavia: "Hard" Law in a "Soft" Law Context, 45 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 363
(1998).
57. Schachter, supra note 51, at 12.
58. See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 52, at 171-225; see generally HARD CHOICES, SOFr LAW:
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE (John J.

Kirton. & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
59. Leaving aside its predecessors, which could be tracked back to the early 18' century. See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, LIMITATIONS
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2006).

60. Schachter, supra note 51, at 13 (arguing "already" that studies based on empirical data in order
to assess the compliance of soft law is missing).
61. See generally KIRTON & TREBILCOCK, supra note 52; Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do CountriesImplement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 647-688 (2002)
(providing empirical evidence of many, especially democratic states complying with the Basle Accord,
through its non-legally binding character).
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specific kind of soft law whose elements include a multitude of legal qualities and
binding force. Using Baade's terminology "zebra codes" seems appropriate inasmuch as the dark stripes could represent the legally binding nature of the CSR
standards and the white strips, the non-legally binding parts.62
When discussing the implementation and compliance with the Guidelines, it
is necessary to distinguish between two soft law addressees. The first addressees
are the MNEs. The Guidelines are a code of conduct addressed to all kinds of
corporations. Second, the adhering countries of the Guidelines, who - as will be
explained below - are responsible for implementing the Guidelines.
D. Implementation Mechanism and Institutions of the Guidelines
1. Overview of Actors andActions to Promote the Guidelines
To promote corporations' compliance with the Guidelines, adhering governments have obliged themselves by a legally binding decision to set up the NCPs.63
The NCPs are government offices responsible for encouraging adherence to the
Guidelines at the national level. 4 For the most part, the NCPs are structured like a
single government department and are usually located in ministries of economics. 65 There are currently forty-two NCPs that correspond to the number of coun66
tries adhering to the Guidelines.
The following additional actors are noteworthy in terms of the institutional set
up: (1) the OECD Investment Committee (IC), (2) the advisory committees of
business and labor federations, and (3) NGOs. 67 The IC meets periodically to exchange views, find decisions in accordance with the Guidelines, and provides
clarifications. 68 Also, the IC is "responsible for overseeing the functioning of the
Guidelines," 69 "with a view to enhancing the effectiveness" 70 of them. However,
sometimes a participating country is represented in the IC by the same governmental official, who represents their country even though they are already exercising the function of a NCP representative.71
62. Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conductfor MNEs, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, 14- 15 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
63. See Convention, supra note 40.
64. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 33-35.
65. National Contact Points, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Sept. 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l7/44/1900962.pdf.
66. Id. The European Union is also involved in consultations on the Guidelines because the Commission of the EU takes part in the work of the OECD in general. A representative on the part of the
EU participates in annual meetings of the NCP but there is no additional "EU NCP."
67. Not included and dealt with here is the important actor "in the background," the OECD Secretariat, in particular the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, which does all the important
preparatory, research, and coordination work related to the Guidelines but which does not play noteworthy role in the implementation of the Guidelines and is therefore not of relevance for this research.
68. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 30, 1, 3 & 4.
69. See id. at 55 14.
70. See id. at 30,1 5.
71. THE BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD, www.biac.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2011); TRADE UNION ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD, http://www.tuac.orglen/

public/index.phtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2011); For more information about OECD watch, see About
OECD Watch, OECD WATCH, http://oecdwatch.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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The non-governmental participants included in the consultation and implementation procedure of the Guidelines are all three main actors of civil society,
which are concerned with CSR issues: business, trade unions and NGOs. 72In
particular, they are represented by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee
to the OECD (BIAC), the Trade Union Advisory Body to the OECD (TUAC), and
by OECD Watch. OECD Watch is an international network of about seventy
civil society organizations that promote corporate accountability.74 To sum up, the
Guidelines are primarily a governmental CSR initiative but aim to integrate the
input of various private actors as well.
2. The National ContactPoints: Role and Function of the Main Actors
The NCPs' obligation consists primarily of promoting the Guidelines and
handling cases concerning specific instances.The drafters placed significant focus
on the implementation of the Guidelines because a control mechanism is crucial to
ensure that the non-binding CSR standards matter. The Procedural Guidance section speaks of the "important role in enhancing the profile and effectiveness of the
Guidelines," while referring to the implementation procedure and allocating this
responsibility in large part to the NCPs.s
In terms of institutional arrangements, the NCPs must develop relationships
with all interested parties, especially representatives of business and labor organizations as well as with NGOs. According to the Procedural Guidance, the NCPs'
"leadership should be such that it retains the confidence of social partners and
fosters the public profile of the Guidelines." 76 Furthermore, NCPs must be "proactive"n to ensure the Guidelines are well known and understood, especially by
national business representatives. NCPs do so by collecting information on national experiences with the Guidelines, by responding to inquiries, and by discussing matters regarding the Guidelines. NCPs also handle issues concerning the
implementation of the Guidelines in cases touching on specific instances.
3. The Specific Instances:A Dispute Resolution Procedurewith Variations
i. Introductionof the Specific Instances and Their Criticism
Any person or organization may approach the NCPs to inquire about whether
the Guidelines apply to a particular conduct of business. If the Guidelines apply
and a dispute arises, the disputes are handled by a grievance mechanism called the
specific instances. The NCP located in the country where the conduct occurred
will usually deal with the issue. If the alleged corporate violation took place in a

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 56, 1 6.
Id. at 57, 9.
Id. at 57, 10.
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country that does not adhere to the Guidelines, a NCP who has a less direct connection to the concerned company may deal with the issue.
Since the revision of the Guidelines, NCPs have or are considering 160 specific instances. Many of these cases concern the respect of human rights and labor
issues. But how the NCPs handle specific instances is debated because critics
speak of an ineffective or a "highly uneven" approach. 80 In particular, it is not
clear what kind of procedure NCPs use for treating specific instances, or - to be
more precise - what are the procedures as there are several. The procedural regulations of the Guidelines provide the NCPs with several options to handle CSR
disputes. Nevertheless, using the phrase "specific instances" instead of a more
concrete term of art for a dispute resolution mechanism seems to indicate vagueness - a phrase which might aim to avoid the conflict of interests characterizing
CSR.81
ii. The ProceduralRegulation in the Guidelines
Part II of the Guidelines, which is the implementation procedures, explains
how the NCPs are to handle cases of specific instances.82 The following excerpts
are of particular interest (the important terms are in italics):
The NCP will contribute to the resolution of issues that arise relating to
implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances. The NCP will offer a forum for discussion and assist the business community, employee
organisations and other parties concerned to deal with the issues raised in
an efficient and timely manner and in accordancewith applicable law.83
Furthermore, the Guidelines explain that the NCP will, where:
the issues raised merit further examination, offer good offices to help the
parties involved to resolve the issues. For this purpose, the NCP will consuit with these parties and where relevant: (...) 2. d. Offer, and with the
agreement of the parties involved, facilitate access to consensual and
non-adversarialmeans, such as conciliation or mediation, to assist in
dealing with the issues. 84

78. For example, an NCP from the country in which the company is registered may deal with the
case. Such a scenario occurred in the case of UK NCP, Survival International against Vedanta Resources, which dealt with alleged corporate abuse in India by a mining company registered in UK.
79. OECD, Report by the Chair of the 2010 Meeting of the National Contact Points, at 18,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/23/46385752.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). It should be noted that
due to some double counting of cases the number of all specific instances will be less than 160. Double
counting occurs when the same specific instances is handled by more than one NCP.
80. See Ruggie, supra note 8.
81. See supra, Part It (discussing the controversies and conflict of interest issues that arise in the
Legal Background of the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate and Movement section).
82. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 29-36.
83. See id. at 34.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the NCPs will if "the parties involved do not reach agreement on the
issues raised, issue a statement, and make recommendations as appropriate,on
the implementation of the Guidelines." If issues arise in non-adhering countries,
the NCPs will "take steps to develop an understanding of the issues involved, and
follow these procedures where relevant and practicable." 86 These provisions are
open to various kinds of interpretations and applications and delegate the "interpretative choice"87 of how to handle specific instances. Among legal scholars the
term "standards" - as opposed to strict/hard/tight rules - is used for these kinds
of norms.89
Thus, the terms of the Guidelines allow NCPs to engage in a range of activities without indicating a priority or specifying which obligation NCPs must perform. However, one of the many questions is whether the NCPs take the spirit and
purpose of the Procedural Guidance into account. That is, do they consider that
the "role of National Contact Points (NCP) is to further the effectiveness of the
Guidelines"? 90
iii.

Analyzing the Dispute Systems of the Specific Instances

The manifold ways in which NCPs handle specific instances must be analyzed in a systematic and comprehensive way in order to understand this kind of
dispute systems. It is clear from the Guidelines' soft law nature that the treatment
of specific instances does not represent adjudication because NCPs lack the authority to issue awards or decisions to disputing parties.91 Instead, NCPs use collaboration to resolve disputes.
Collaborative governance requires NCPs to use deliberative and consensual
methods, rather than adversarial or adjudicative methods. 92 According to the
Guidelines, the NCPs should "offer good offices to help the parties involved to
resolve the issues." 93 "Good offices" can be interpreted in many ways. Even

85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 35.
87. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretative Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74 (2000).
88. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term. Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992) (pointing out the terminological debate of the rules vs. standards debate which is comparable to the hard law vs. soft law debate).
89. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557-629
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953-1026 (1995); Frederick Schauer,
The Convergence of Rules and Standards,2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303 (2003); Allen S. Weiner, The Use
Of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicinefor New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 415, 426
(2006). In addition, some international law scholars use interchangeably the term "standards" for
specific kinds of soft law. Compare John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction, HARD
CHOICES, Sovr LAW. VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL

GOVERNANCE (2004).
90. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 33.
91. See Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Frameworkfor Dispute Systems Design, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 123, 165 (2009) (providing definitions of adjudication).
92. Compare Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the
Legal Infrastructurefor CollaborativeGovernance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297 (2010) (discussing collaborative governance).
93. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, 34.
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though NCPs use collaboration, the Guidelines' procedural regulations expressly
mention mediation as a possible way to deal with disputes.94
Mediation is defined as facilitated negotiation tending to a consensual resolution of a dispute on terms that the parties themselves agree upon and which requires that the mediator seeks to determine the interests of the parties.95 In addition to mediation as one form of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
(ADR), the NCPs apply hybrid procedures.
In hybrid procedures, elements from different processes are incorporated into
a unified proceeding. In regard to the treatment of specific instances, the following procedures could be practiced either alternatively or combined into hybrid
processes: mediation, conciliation, fact finding, and facilitation.
Unlike mediation, conciliation in the international context is understood to be
an impartial examination of the dispute, by which the commission set up by the
Parties attempts "to define the terms of a settlement susceptible of being accepted
by them."97
Furthermore, some NCPs could see their role as fact finders, which is an independent process by which a neutral arbiter determines the facts relevant to the
controversy. This process of fact finding separates the function of defining the
problem from developing a solution.98 Alternatively, NCPs could see their role
and function as facilitators. As facilitators, experts conduct meetings and coordinate discussions among parties to reach a goal or to complete a task that meets the
participants' mutual satisfaction. 99 Hence, facilitation is comparable to mediation,
though the interests of the parties are not determined.
But how do these procedures look like in the actual practice of the NCPs? In a
survey, the NCPs were asked to rank the possible objectives they aim to achieve.
To ask for the goal of a dispute system is inspired by the analytical framework for
dispute systems design elaborated by Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez.0
These authors analyze ADR systems in terms of their possible goals, processes
and structures, stakeholders, resources, success and accountability. With regard to
accountability - indicating the "success" of a dispute system according to Smith
and Martinez' 01 - it is of particular interest whether the system is "transparent in
terms of its operation, access to processes, and its results, and to whom." 02 Based
on this analytical framework this socio-legal study attempts to clarify in particular
the goals and the accountability of the dispute systems provided by the NCPs.
Another point of interest is whether the results of the NCPs' promotion of the
Guidelines advance CSR. It is important to note that the promotion and advance94. Id. at 59.
95. See Smith & Martinez, supra note 91, at 168.
96. CPR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR

CONFLICT

PREVENTION

AND

RESOLUTION,

http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ADRPrimer.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
97. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 64 (2005) (referring to art. I of the

Regulations on the Procedure of International Conciliation adopted by the Institute of International
Law in 1961); BARRY E. CARTER, PHILIP R. TRIMPLE, & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW,

290(2007).
98. See Smith & Martinez, supranote 91, at 168.
99. Id. at 167.
100. Id. at 124.
101. Id. at 133.
102. Id. at 132.
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ment of CSR can have various meanings. It can mean the change of corporate
behaviour after noncompliance with the Guidelines was established in a specific
instance. Alternatively, it can mean the clarification or concretization of the meaning of a CSR standard in a specific instance. Because CSR is a comparably young
policy and people concerned with it are sometimes not sure about its meaning or
appropriate application, further clarifications are necessary. Specific instances
could be used to offer an understanding and concretization, comparable to case
law. This would require a general practice of publishing final statements on the
cases, however. Moreover, the final statements would need to provide sufficient
information to enable the understanding of the issue as well as the procedure and
outcomes.
IV. THE CSR DISPUTES UNDER THE OECD GUIDELINES: APPLIED ADR
MECHANISMS
A. The Handling of Specific Instances: Variations, Distinctions,and
Common Grounds
In this part of the article the results of the socio-legal study will be presented.
First, the various NCP practices in terms of publishing statements will be highlighted. This aspect is important with regard to the transparency and accountability of this dispute resolution mechanism and to its impact of advancing CSR. Second, NCPs' reasons for determining whether a case merits a further examination
or not, is also explored in this part of the article. The results of the initial assessments - the first phase of specific instances - are insightful because they shed
light on an important aspect of this dispute system for which barely any other
resource is available. Third, this part will also demonstrate: (1) what procedures
and outcomes can be found in the second phase of the Guidelines' dispute system,
when a specific instance merits a further examination; (2) how do the NCPs understand their roles and functions and what objectives do they aim to achieve under the Guidelines; (3) and after reviewing the NCPs' responses to their roles,
functions, and objectives, this part of the article will assert the question of whether
a non-adversarial procedure is compatible with the examination of the CSRconsistency of a corporate act. If so, why and how is a non-adversarial procedure
compatible with the examination of the CSR-consistency of a corporate act?
1. The Variations in Publishing Statements
i. The Varying Statement Policies
By April 2011, 31 of 42 NCPs have handled specific instances and there are
considerable variations in terms of the "workload" as well as the publication of
statements. This study illustrates that: 14 of 31 NCPs have dealt or are dealing
with between one and three cases; nine NCPs have four to seven cases; and the
NCPs of the following countries are or have been concerned with nine (France,
Switzerland), twelve (Brazil, Belgium), fourteen (Germany), twenty-three (Netherlands), twenty-four (UK) or twenty-six (US) cases.
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The analysis of the cases bears some difficulties insofar as the NCPs have
published final statements or reports' 0 3 in no more than fifty-seven specific instances.'0 In many cases, these statements describe - or sometimes even outline
briefly - the issue and the incidents. In particular, there are remarkable variations
concerning the precision of the information on parties and issues provided in final
statements. In the specific instances, it is often not possible to determine the factual influence or legal relationship' 05 the company had in terms of the alleged
corporate non-compliance with the Guidelines." Furthermore, it is not possible to
identify the issue in 11 of 57 final statements.' 07 But in other cases the NCPs provide relevant details on the parties to enable readers to understand why and how
the parties are concerned with the particular case. 08 In cases in which NCPs examined whether a corporation acted consistent or not with the Guidelines, the
discrepancies in the quality and extent of reasoning are especially striking and
important.109 Besides collecting facts, the question of their evaluation is relevant.
103. The Canadian NCP has published with regard to its four concluded cases reports but as of yet no
"final statements" in the sense of the Guidelines. However, in terms of the amount of information
provided in these reports a differentiation to the statements of some other NCP is not given. The Brazilian NCP has also published a "report" for one case.
104. Statements by National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en 2649_34889 2489211l111,00.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2011). On this OECD website there is also a link to all governmental websites.
105. In terms of "legal relationship," it has to be considered that in many specific instances multinational companies participated which were not immediately involved in the alleged abuses. The cases
provided informative statements, which revealed that in some cases this relationship to the business
directly involved one of ownership or one vaguely characterized by a "business relationship." In other
cases subsidiaries or supply chains were affected.
106. See the statements of the following cases which are only one page long and very limited with
regard to the provided information: Marks & Spencer: Communiqud Du Point De Contact National
Frangais, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/39/2489273.pdf [hereinafter
France NCP, Marks & Spencer]; see also Recommandations du Point de Contact National Frangais e
L'intention des Entreprises au Sujet de la Question du Travail Force en Birmanie, Mar. 28, 2002,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/40/2489266.pdf [hereinafter France NCP on Forced
labour in Burma].
107. See Press Release, Swiss Contact Point Welcomes Korean Trade Union Delegation, Nov. 21,
2003, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/15/38033610.pdf [hereinafter Swiss NCP, Nestle];
Canadian National Contact Point Statement Concerning Ivanhoe Mines Ltd in Burma, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/24/37205653.pdf [hereinafter Canadian NCP, Ivanhoe Mines Ltd];
Canadian National Contact Point Statement Concerning Ascendant Copper Corp. in Ecuador, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/24/37205653.pdf [hereinafter Canadian NCP, Ascendant
Copper Corp.]; Statement from the Swedish National Contact Point with Reference to Specific Instances Received Concerning Atlas Copco and Sandvik, June 2003, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/34/15595948.pdf [hereinafter Swedish NCP, Atlas Copco and Sandvik].
108. See all the specific instances of the UK NCP, available at http://www.oecd.org/
document/59/0,3746,en_2649_34889_2489211 1 _1_,00.html; see also all the specific instances of
the Austrian NCP, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649348892489211
1 l_I1,00.html; see also Record of Specific Instances: First Quantum Minerals Ltd and Oxfam
Canada, available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ncppcn/specific-specifique.aspx?lang=eng&view=d [hereinafter Canadian NCP, First Quantum Minerals];
Closing Statement: Specific Instance Regarding Triumph in the Philippines and in Thailand, Jan 14.
2011, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/52/48755989.pdf [herinafter Swiss NCP, Triumph
in Philippines and Thailand].
109. To compare the different efforts and standards of the UK and the Swedish NCP, see Final
Statement by the UK National Contact Pointfor the OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises:
Afrimex (UK) LTD, Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/29/43750590.pdf
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NCPs' public statements lack uniformity, even though the Guidelines are exceptionally clear on issuing statements because they require the publication of
statements for cases in which NCPs conduct a "further examination."' 10 However,
while doing so the NCPs are also asked to consider confidentiality, which might
present a reason for not publishing a statement if this "would be in the best interests of effective implementation of the Guidelines.""'

ii. Conclusion on Statements and the Various Kinds of Their Publications
The NCPs have different practices and responses to whether published statements are necessary. For example, they also disagree on whether statements
should provide detailed information. Because some NCPs have broadly interpreted the Guidelines' guidance on publishing statements, their approach to the
matter raises transparency issues and it is questionable whether their kind of publishing statements advances CSR. Specific instances without detailed statements
cannot provide lessons and documented experiences for all concerned parties. The
lack of significant statements can be particularly harmful for NCPs that may be
confronted with questions about whether they are issuing consistent statements for
comparable cases or issues. Detailed statements in some published cases that have
articulated NCPs' reasoning provide instructive insights and lessons. NCPs' proceedings are not transparent when NCPs do not issue significant statements. In
these cases the general public is prevented from having access to information that
is necessary to assess NCPs' proceedings-which is a fundamental issue for dispute resolution systems in general.112

2. FirstPhase: The InitialAssessment of Specific Instances
NCPs make initial assessments when they are presented with an alleged special instance. Under the Guidelines, the initial assessments consist of two inquiries: (1) "whether the issues raised merit further examination," (2) and whether the
NCPs shall "offer good offices to help the parties involved to resolve the issues."" 3 In terms of the initial assessment practice, information is particularly
hard to come by since the majority of NCPs publish - if at all - final statements
about cases that necessitated "further examination."ll14 And even in cases with
[hereinafter UK NCP, Afrimex]; Final Statement by the UK National Contact Pointfor the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Sept. 25, 2009, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/49/16/43884129.pdf [hereinafter UK NCP, Vedanta Resources]; Statement by the Swedish
National Contact Point in connection with a complaintfrom CEDHA against Nordea, Jan. 24, 2008,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/23/40016775.pdf [hereinafter Swedish NCP, CEDHA
against Nordea]; Swedish NCP, Atlas Copco and Sandvick, supra note 104.
110. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34 & 59.
111. See id. at 34.
112. Telephone interview with Swiss NCP (March 3rd, 2011) (affirming this argument and stating that
Switzerland has the position with regard to the revision process of the Guidelines that all NCPs shall
publish statements also in cases where no agreements could be achieved). For some interview citations,
initials are used in lieu of names (NCP nationalities) in order to preserve source confidentiality;
sources' real initials are used only with permission.
113. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34.
114. The UK NCP is in this regard an exemption due to its publications of initial assessments,
See Final Statements, BIS, http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-sectors/low-carbon-business-
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published statements, in 22 of 57 such cases there is no indication about how the
communication between the NCP and the parties looked like during the initial
assessment. It would be of particular interest to know what factors influenced a
NCP to close a case while concluding that it "merits no further examination."
Indeed, due to the vagueness of the expression "merit further examination" the
evaluation of this question may present some challenges to NCPs.1 5
While a socio-legal study could clarify numerous aspects of the practical handling of initial assessments, this article will focus on the reasons why NCPs denied or would deny a further consideration of a specific instance. To do so, the
NCPs were given a questionnaire and asked to identify reasons for which they
deny a further procedure. The results are summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Reasons for which NCPs did or would deny a further consideration
of a specific instance
Reasons

Number of NCPs

1. Raised issue is not within the scope of
the Guidelines (misinterpretation of their
content or meaning)

17

2. Raised issue is not bonafide (according
to the commentaries of the Guidelines)

11

3. The party raising an issue does not
provide sufficient information about its
allegations

9

4. The party raising an issue does not
provide sufficient evidence to support its
allegations

8

5. Lacking investment nexus

8

6. There is already a parallel proceeding
dealing with the same issue

5

7. The concerned corporation is unwilling
to participate in a specific instance

2

opportun ities/sustainable-development/corporate-responsibilityuk-ncp-oecd-guidelines/cases/finalstatements (while differentiating between initial assessments of cases under further examination,
closed cases and last but not least withdrawn cases. Statements on withdrawn cases are most interesting because the statements lack information on this constellation).
115. Phone interview with L.B. (March I" 2011) (initials used to preserve confidentiality).
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The strong approval of the majority of responding NCPs with regard to the
first two reasons is not surprising but was expected: these reasons are based on the
text of the Guidelines .116
The responding NCPs' statements about the lack of sufficient information and
lack of sufficient evidence are revealing. The responses highlight that collecting
enough information is a central challenge for the parties raising issues as well as
for the NCPs assessing cases. It also highlights that the involved corporation's
cooperation and willingness to provide information is crucial. It is questionable
whether it is the right decision to close a file still in the early stages-considering
that this is the general obstacle for assessing CSR issues. In order to strengthen
this dispute resolution mechanism NCPs should communicate to the parties that a
statement will be published in cases where the corporation resists cooperation so
that the public can assess and interpret the conduct of the corporation. The way in
which the NCPs deal with companies failing to cooperate during this procedure
affects the NCPs' credibility, public authority, and functionality of the ADR
mechanism.
Furthermore, a lack of investment nexus and parallelproceedings"8 were
identified by eight and five NCPs respectively as reasons to deny further consideration. Both points have been debated for years both on the part of civil society
and among the NCPs themselves. These points have been taken up in the pending
update of the Guidelines, and shall therefore not be discussed in depth here.' 19
Finally, two NCPs responded that a case would not be considered further if
the concerned corporation was unwilling to participate in the process. This answer
is highly problematic even though - as already explained - it is not disputed how
difficult it is to promote participation in a voluntary procedure. The NCPs should
be aware of the consequences: if a NCP closes a file without any consequences like publishing a statement and reporting the corporation's conduct - the corporate
power will prevail over the public authority of the NCP, and this will harm the
credibility of the procedure.
3. Second Phase: The Case "Merits a FurtherExamination"
The survey and interviews conducted for this article revealed that NCPs had
different interpretations about how to carry out "merit a further examination."l20
The study revealed that many NCPs themselves need more information in order to
understand the practices of other NCPs. 121 In short, everyone has the impression
116. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1,at 58.
117. See Scope of the Guidelines and the Investment Nexus, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/3/
0,3746,en_2649_34889_37356074_11l_,00.htmI (last visited May 24, 2011).
118. The term of art parallel proceedings means that a business conduct of a specific instance is
already the subject of other proceedings at the sub-national, national or international levels. See for
detailed discussions on this topic: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Annual Meeting of
the National Contact Points Report by the Chair at 74- 78 (June 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/33/37439881.pdf.
119. Id.
120. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1,at 34.
121. Telephone interview with L.B. (March l' 2011), telephone interview with Swiss NCP (March
3 d, 2011) (initials used to preserve confidentiality); telephone interview with UK NCP (March 4",
2011). The need for more transparency and information about the practices of other NCPs was also

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss2/6

20

Davarnejad: Davarnejad: In the Shadow of Soft Law

No. 2]

In the Shadow of Soft Law

371

that there are differences but no one can identify them categorically and in depth.
In terms of conceptual discrepancies, NCPs can essentially be divided into two
camps: first, there are those who limit their efforts to providing services to facilitate a dialogue or mediate between the parties; and second, there are those who, in
addition to facilitation, examine the corporate act in question and state whether it
was consistent or inconsistent with the Guidelines.
As will be explained in more detail, the survey and interviews provide much
needed information to identify and understand these conceptual differences, which
have led not only to variousforms of handling specific instances by the NCPs, but
actually to different kinds of procedures.
i. Applied Proceduresand Outcomes
The NCPs apply different procedures when handling specific instances. When
the NCPs were asked about the procedures they apply in specific instances, 23 of
25 cooperative NCPs responded to these particular questions of the survey. Five
of the NCPs had stated that they had not handled a case yet. Hence, their responses are meant to elicit what practices they would apply. The NCPs were asked
to select all practices they used when carrying out "merit a further examination."
The following table sums up the results.
Table 2: The procedures applied by NCPs for further consideration of a
specific instance.
- The NCP offers both parties a forum for discussion to present their
positions and to provide their information.
never: 0 NCP
in general: 15 NCPs sometimes: 3 NCPs
- In addition and if necessary the NCP conducts its own investigations.
sometimes: 12 NCPs never: 0 NCP
in general: 5 NCPs
- In addition and if necessary the NCP offers access to consensual and
non-adversarial means, such as conciliation or mediation, to assist the
parties in dealing with the issues.
in general: 11 NCPs sometimes: 6 NCPs never: 0 NCP
- In addition the NCP analyzes the issue and provides the parties with its
assessment and findings.
sometimes: 7 NCPs never: 2 NCPs
in general: 7 NCPs
- In addition and if necessary the NCP gives recommendations addressed
to the parties about how to resolve the issue or how to change their
practices.
in general: 7 NCPs
sometimes: 8 NCPs never: I NCP

expressed by several of the twenty-five NCPs who have responded to the survey while expressing their
interest in the outcome of this study.
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These results highlight several points. First, they affirm the variations of applied processes. Second, they also expose NCPs' flexible approach to cases because the NCPs' responses to the various procedures outlined in the survey varied.
Because each NCP selected different procedures, the CSR dispute system under
the Guidelines must be categorized as an integration of different hybrid procedures including several procedures mentioned in Table 2.122
This study reveals the diversity of practices of only a subset of 23 of the 42
NCPs. Nevertheless, the twenty-three NCPs' responses illuminate why many
criticize NCPs for not applying a uniform procedure to specific instances. The
variations are not surprising, however, when one takes into account the multilateral character of the implementation of this dispute system and the standards established in the procedural guidance, which allow for variations. Further, the
openness of this dispute system is advantageous because the CSR disputes are
very different and require various procedures. In addition, the NCPs have the ability to try out different practices and share their experiences in a relatively new
field of issues and a new dispute system.
However, the accountability of a dispute system requires transparency, especially during the processes of resolving a dispute.1 23 Because many variations of
procedures and outcomes of specific instances were identified by the NCPs, each
of them should at least provide clarity in terms of its own procedures. Insofar as
clarity is concerned, the governmental websites of most of the NCPs and the information provided on the OECD website needs improvement. Each NCP as well
as the OECD should provide more clarity and information. The lack of transparency is the main issue of this dispute system.
ii. The Various Roles, Functionsand Objectives of NCPs
In addition to the questions about procedures and outcomes, the NCPs were
asked in the survey to select and rank their roles, functions, and objectives when
they approach new CSR disputes. The below results illuminate the differences in
the NCP's practices.
a. The VariationsAmong the NCPs in Understandingtheir Roles and
Function
NCPs were asked to rank the following four roles and functions during special instances. Below are the roles and functions NCPs associate with their duty to
handle specific instances:
1) To serve as a neutral channel of communication between parties;
2) To be a mediator and actively try to resolve disputes;
3) To examine and clarify whether the practice of a corporation was consistent with the Guidelines;
4) To advance corporate responsibility in concrete cases where corporate
practice is not consistent with the Guidelines.
122. The NCPs also had space to add remarks while filling in the questionnaire. However, no additional process was mentioned in the notes.
123. See Bingham, supra note 92, at 302.
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The above roles and functions are not an exhaustive list, however.124 Below are
four charts that present the results of the survey, answered by 25 of a total of 42
NCPs:
Figure 1: Neutral channel of communication between parties
To serve as a neutral channel of communication between
parties
12

Number of
4

1

2

3

4

Rank of u portance (1 beimgiiio st inipottant)
3 NCPs did nt rank at all - i.e. this role/function does
not apply to them at all

Figure 2: Mediator and actively resolve disputes
To be a mediator and actively try to resolve disputes
12

Nurnberof

6

--

NCPs

2

4 -

1

2

3

4

Pankof impotance I bemg most importanti
3 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this role/function does
not apply to them at all

124. In addition, the NCPs could indicate other roles and functions that are important to them.
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Figure 3: Examining and clarifying the consistency of a corporate action with
the Guidelines
To examine and clarify whetherthe practice of a corporation
was consistent with the Guidelines
12
10
Nurnbersof
NCPs

6
4

2

1

3

4

Rankof importance (1 being most important)
3 NCPs did not rank at all- i.e. this role/function does
not applyto them at all

Figure 4: Advancing CSR in concrete cases where Guidelines are not respected

To advance corporate responsibility in concrete cases where
corporate practiceis not consistent with the Guidelines

6
Numberof 4
NCPS
3-

1

2

3

4

Rankof importance (1 being most important)
6 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this role function does
not applyto them at all
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aa. Serving as a Neutral Channel of Communication Between Partiesand
Trying to Actively Resolve Disputes as Mediators
The first two roles and functions on the list were expected to receive high
rankings because they touch on the content analysis of specific instances." The
surveyed NCPs did not seem to dispute the roles of neutral channels of communication or mediator. Accordingly, the NCPs ranked the two roles and functions as
the most important in the list. However, it is remarkable that three NCPs believed
acting as a neutral channel of communication or mediator was not important to
them. Hence, even with regard to an aspect that does not seem to be debated, there
is some discrepancy.
bb. Examining and Clarifying Whether the Practiceof a Corporationwas
Consistent with the Guidelines
The NCPs understanding of their role in determining whether the corporate
operations in question were consistent with the Guidelines is important because
this issue represents the core debate among the NCPs. Fifteen NCPs ranked this
function to be their first or second most important. This is a considerable number
and this result is consistent with the results in table 2, where fourteen NCPs stated
to generally analyze the CSR consistency of a corporate act. This suggests that a
few NCPs do not examine corporate acts while four NCPs ranked this function as
most important.126
cc. Advancing CorporateResponsibility in Concrete Cases Where
CorporatePracticeis Not Consistent with the Guidelines
Finally, the NCPs were asked to rank the importance of their role and function in the advancement of CSR in actual cases where corporations did not respect
the Guidelines. Six NCPs did not rank this question, and this role and function has
the lowest ranking. A low ranking could express many NCPs' scepticism and
doubts concerning their potential impact on corporations. If so, this doubt would
be understandable because of the difficulty of this task and the NCPs limited possibilities of influencing the parties. However, it is important to note that three
NCPs stated that this function is their highest priority while six NCPs ranked it as
their second most important function.

125. This result was evident in the original version of this study in which the results of the content
analysis of all fifty-seven statements published by May 2011 were included (original study on file with
author).
126. See ATTAC & FoE Sweden vs. Atlas Copco, Case Overview, OECD WATCH,
http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case 30/?searchterm=atlas%20copco;see also ATTAC & FoE Sweden v.
Sandvic, Case Overview, OECD WATCH, http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_29/?searchterm=sandvik
(mediation procedure was interrupted as soon as examination was accomplished).
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dd. FinalRemark
Another interesting finding is that at least three NCPs viewed all functions
and roles (different ones in each case) to be unimportant. This suggests there is
not a consensus amongst the NCPs about their role and function when handling
specific instances. Accordingly, the NCPs rank their objectives in specific instances differently, which is illustrated below.
b. The VariationsAmong the NCPs in Defining Their Objectives
The NCPs were also asked to rank the importance of the following six possible objectives they may seek to advance when considering specific instances:
1) Encouraging the business to comply with the Guidelines;
2) Strengthening mutual confidence between business and societies in
which they operate;
3) Reaching an agreement between the parties on the substance of the issues
raised;
4) Clarifying and examining whether the practice of a corporation is consistent with the Guidelines;
5) Following up on whether the NCP's consideration of the specific instance has helped to resolve the issue;
6) Publishing the NCP's findings as to whether the practice of a corporation
is consistent with the Guidelines.
The NCPs could also indicate other objectives that were important to them.
Below are six charts that present 25 NCPs' answers.
Figure 5: Encouraging the business to comply with the Guidelines
Encouragingthe businessto complywith the Guidelines
10
Numberof
NCPs

6

2

0
3
4
2
1
Rank of importance (1 being most important)
1 NCP did not rank at all - i.e. this objective does
notapplyto this NCP at all
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Figure 6: Strengthening mutual confidence between businesses and
societies in which they operate
Strengthening mutual confidence between businesses and
societies in which they operate
10

Numllber'of6
NCPs

6
3
4
2
Rankof iuportance (1 bemIg most important)
2 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this objective does not
apply to them at all
1

Figure 7: Reaching an agreement between the parties on the substance of the
issues raised
Reaching an agreement hetween the parties on the substance
ol the issues raised
12
10

Number of6
NCPs
4
2
4
2
3
1
Rlankofimupor tance [1 being most important)
2 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this objective does not
applyto them at all
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Figure 8: Clarifying and examining whether the practice of a corporation is
consistent with the Guidelines
Clarifying and examining whether the practice of a
corporation is consistent with the Guidelines

I

Number of 4
NCPs 3
2
1
0

1

2
3
4
5
6
Rank of importance (1 being most important)
4 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this objective does not
apply to them at all
Figure 9: Publishing our NCP's findings as to whether the practice of a corporation is consistent with the Guidelines
Publishing our NCP's findings as to whether the practice ofa
corporation is consistent with the Guidelines

Number of
NCPs

5

1

24

5

1
2
3
4
5
6
Rankof importance (1 being most important]
9 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this objective does not
applyat all to them
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Figure 10: Following up on whether the NCP's consideration oft he specific
instance has helped to resolve the issue
Following up on whether the NCP s

tonsideration of the

specifiins etehashelped Lo resolve t eisue
7
5
-

Numnberof 4
NCPs
3

Rink of importance (1 beingmoestuinportant)
10 NCPs did not rank at all - i.e. this objective does not
apply at all to them

aa. The Challenge of Ranking Goals
The first interesting observation is that some NCPs had difficulties in ranking
their objectives in the sense that four of them classified some of their goals at the
same level. 127 This might be telling. In order to illustrate the importance of prioritizing goals the focus shall be on the two functions, which represent the main
debate among the NCPs: mediation/seeking an agreement vs. examination/clarifying the CSR consistency of corporate actions. "Reaching an agreement
between the parties on the substance of the issues raised" (figure 7) was ranked
most often as the most important goal, closely followed by "encouraging the business to comply with the Guidelines" (figure 6). In contrast, fewer NCPs ranked
"clarifying and examining whether the practice of a corporation is consistent with
the Guidelines" (figure 8) as most important or on lower degrees of importance.
This result is not surprising but affirms the content analysis of the statements as
well as the ranking in terms of the function and roles of NCPs. However, two
NCPs ranked these two objectives as equally important. This leads to the question:
if this is possible and meaningful in practice then what is the relationship between
these two objectives? And is not rather necessary to prioritize one of these goals,
which are according to some NCPs even opposite? This central question is further
explored in the next subsection.

127. This becomes visible if one counts the total of the first rank of all six objectives, which are
thirty-six.
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bb. The Relevance of PublishingFindingsand Following Up on Disputes
Furthermore it is remarkable that the objectives of publishing findings (figure
9) and following up on whether the NCPs' consideration has helped to resolve
disputes (figure 10) are not ranked at all by 9 out of 10 NCPs. This suggests that a
large number of NCPs are not aware of the relevance of these two aspects for their
work. A follow up provision is crucial to promote compliance with the Guidelines
and with the outcome of the procedure as far as an agreement or recommendations
are given. However, some NCPs are aware of the importance of this step to
strengthen the impact of this dispute resolution mechanism and ask both parties to
report back to the NCP on the implementation of their recommendations. 128 Six
NCPs declared to practice a follow up.1 29 The attitude of many NCPs towards
publishing outcomes of their procedures confirms the findings of their current
practice of publishing statements, which is problematic and reduces the impact of
this procedure.' 30

cc. FinalRemarks
In sum, a complex task, such as providing a dispute resolution procedure to
resolve CSR issues, requires identifying important goals and prioritizing them.
Because the NCPs are in a permanent process of reflecting how to improve their
dispute resolution mechanism, a discussion over or common approach of defining
and ranking goals could be useful. While doing so, it is also important to be aware
of the benefits of activities which might not be the main focus but are important to
strengthen the impact of a dispute resolution mechanism (publication and follow
up of the outcome). Hence, more reflection and debate about the goals and their
prioritization are necessary in order to enhance the impact of this ADR procedure
under the OECD Guidelines, especially because it lacks any possibility to enforce
its outcomes.

iii.

The Main Debate: CollaborativeDispute Resolution vs. Examination

The survey as well as the content analysis of the final statements highlighted
the NCPs different opinions about how to carry out examinations. Interviews with
NCP officials illuminated how such discrepancies are at the heart of the CSR dispute system debate. While some NCPs think that is not within their mandate to
investigate whether corporations are compliant with the Guidelines,' 3 1 other NCPs
128. See UK NCP - Complaints Procedures, BIS, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/
business-sectors/low-carbon-business-opportunities/sustainable-development/corporate-responsibility/
uk-ncp-oecd-guidelines/complaints-procedures. The Dutch NCP also introduced a general follow up
for all cases.
129. Beside a general practice (three NCPs), one NCP stated that it asked the parties to report back in
"appropriate cases." Another NCP explained to follow up a case if the parties have agreed upon this
during the process. The follow up practice of another NCP is that the complaining party might be
asked to report back upon the follow up of the case (statements on file with author).
130. Compare Part IV. A. 1.
131. Compare the Canadian and Swiss NCPs, while expressing their positions in the cases Swiss
NCP, Triumph in Philippines and Thailand, supra note 108, and Canadian NCP, Ascendant Copper
Corp., supra note 107.
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examine and evaluate corporate acts in particular cases. The reasons provided for
a negative assessment of examinations are either that they are not regarded to be
helpful for a collaborative approach of solving disputes or that the possibilities of
the NCPs are too limited to investigate or to gain evidence.132
This debate among the NCPs requires a comprehensive analysis. Therefore
the different kinds and constellations of examinations will be distinguished in the
following. Afterwards it will be discussed whether following a non-adversarial
procedure while examining the CSR consistency of corporate acts would represent
conflicting goals or interests. Finally, it will be questioned whether this central
debate is related to the soft law nature of the Guidelines and represent a legalistic
approach to this dispute system.
a. Kinds and Variances of Examinations
NCPs also have different approaches on how they carry out examinations.
33
The UK NCP, for instance, views an examination as "the second phase" of
mediation and only examines corporate behavior in cases where a corporation did
not cooperate in the "forum for discussion."l 34 This practice is based on the belief
that such an examination is necessary and can be used as "leverage" to influence a
corporation to respect CSR standards.' 35 The Dutch NCP, on the other hand, classifies its procedure as a "future oriented process" aiming at resolving current issues in an "amicable way."' 36 It does so by taking alleged violations as a "starting
point."' 3 7 During the "starting point" the Dutch NCP tries to verify the facts while
organizing interactions between the parties.138 Even though the tone of the Dutch
39
NCP is "amicable" by primarily aiming to publish a joint statement in connection with the parties' agreement, the examination is comprehensive and proves
subject matter expertise of this NCP in CSR.
Examinations can be distinguished in terms of the comprehensiveness of their
reasoning and regarding their relationship to non-adversarial procedures. The
Dutch and the UK NCPs are the two most significant NCPs who practice comprehensive examinations while prioritizing non-adversarial procedures. However,

132. Telephone interview with L.B. (March I' 2011) (initials used to preserve confidentiality); Telephone interview with Swiss NCP (March 3rd,2011).
133. Telephone interview with UK NCP (March 4 h,2011).
134. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 1, at 13. A "forum for discussion" is another expression used
by the Guidelines in order to express what the NCPs provide to promote the Guidelines.
135. Id.
136. See FinalStatement of the Dutch NCP on the Specific Instance Raised by Shehri-CBE Concerning Makro-Habib Pakistan Limited, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
1/45/46085466.pdf [herinafter Dutch NCP, Makro-Habib]; See also Final Statement of the Dutch
NCP on the Complaint on the Violations of PilipinasShell Petroleum Corp., Dec. 20, 2010, available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/12/43663730.pdf [herinafter Dutch NCP, Shell].
137. Telephone interview with Dutch NCP (March 17th, 2011).
138. See Dutch NCP, Makro-Habib, supra note 136, at 3.
139. Compare Joint Statement by the Netherlands National Contact Point, Adidas and the India
Committee of the Netherlands, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/43/
2489243.pdf [herinafter Netherlands NCP, Adidas] and Joint Statement by the NCP, FNV, CNV, and
IHC Caland, July 2004, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/2/38031193.pdf [herinafter Joint
Statement].
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other NCPs issue opinions about whether corporations are compliant with the
CSR standards are analytically similar to legal opinions.140
Yet, some NCPs practice a different approach. Some NCPs conduct an examination during the mediation process and then stop the mediation process after
they have concluded that a questionable corporate act did not violate the CSR
standards.141 In this approach, an examination preserves the efforts of conducting
mediation but runs the risk of not being transparent if the NCPs' determination is
not detailed and comprehensible.14 2
b. Non-adversarialProcedureand Examination: Conflicting Interests or
Goals?
Is the examination of whether a corporation's action is consistent with CSR
standards in the framework of a specific instance, necessary or disadvantageous to
the mediation procedure? The NCPs are not in agreement in their responses to
such a question. NCPs simultaneously or subsequently collect information, prepare mediation procedures and examine corporate actions. Opponents of NCPs
examining corporate conduct argue that such a process hinders mediation efforts.
Nevertheless, such an argument is moot as long as NCPs conduct an examination
after mediation efforts have failed. This would allow NCPs' examination to act as
the "second phase of mediation."1 43
In general, it can be stated that combined forms of ADR mechanisms in a unified procedure, called hybrid processes, exist--especially regarding mediations.144
When dealing with specific instances,corporations, at times, fail to cooperate in
mediation procedures. When mediation is not possible in such a scenario, an examination is no longer harmful. When this happens, trust and respect in the dispute resolution procedure is at stake especially when a NCP does not impose a
consequence on the uncooperative company. The uncooperative company would
prevail over the public authority of the NCPs. In such a scenario, it is advisable
for a NCP to publish a statement to report the company's lack of cooperation. The
statement should explain the CSR issue and why the corporation's cooperation is
necessary. Because a public statement could require a company to explain its action, such a company would likely be more motivated to cooperate in the mediation procedures.

140. Compare Final Assessment by the UK National Contact Point (PSA Peugeot), Feb. 1, 2008,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/50/43750215.pdf [herinafter UK NCP, PSA Peugeot]
and UK NCP, Afrimex (UK) Ltd., supra note 109.
In terms of a clear structured and convincing kind of reasoning see also Report of National
Contact Points (Norway), June 2006, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/
Vedlegg/Naeringsliv/2006 NCPReportNorway.pdf. However, the last case was very debated in
terms of the jurisdiction of the Norwegian NCP.
141. See Swedish NCP, CEDHA against Nordea, supra note 109; see also Swedish NCP, Atlas
Copco and Sandvik, supra note 107.
142. Id.
143. Telephone interview with UK NCP (March 4, 2011) (where this metaphor was used, indicating
the practice of an examination if mediation efforts fail).
144. See CPR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICr PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, supra note
96 (referring to the definition of hybrid procedures in which elements from different processes are
incorporated into a unified proceeding).
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Regarding the Dutch NCP approach, an examination in such a situation is the
basis for a "future focused" approach. This approach requires an analysis of the
company's past or present conduct in order to discover whether a company should
change its conduct to respect CSR standards in the future. Under this method, it is
important to communicate the necessity of such an examination as a learning
process without any risk of sanction.
The third possible benefit of a good examination of the CSR issue and its
publication is that this could be used as lessons for anyone interested in or concerned with CSR. Indeed, the final statements, which are characterized with a
comprehensive analysis of the CSR issue and subject matter expertise, are instructive and could be valuable for a broader public.14 5 This could also be qualified as
an advancement of CSR because such an analysis of a concrete case helps the
public understand how CSR is applied in practice. But such an examination has to
be professional and should provide sufficient information and explanation in order
to be convincing and understandable. This would, again, strengthen the trust and
respect in the work of the NCPs.
c. Examinations:LegalisticApproaches in the Shadow of Soft Law?
Could this debate be linked to the Guidelines' soft law nature? The opponents
of the examination approach believe that this approach would be too legalisticsome even equate an examination with adjudication. 14 6 But the specific instances
procedures cannot lead to adjudication because NCPs lack the authority to obligate a corporation to comply with the terms of its decision. Examination and adjudication must be separated in the same way that soft law and enforceable law must
be distinguished. It is possible - and, as explained, beneficial for several reasons to analyse whether a corporate act is consistent with CSR standards. This does not
mean or require that such an examination - with the finding that a corporate act is
inconsistent with CSR - must be enforced. To analyze whether a corporate act is
consistent with CSR standards, a NCP would have to collect relevant information
and analyze the information in relation to unenforceable norms. Hence, such an
examination is in essence a "legalistic approach."l 47 One NCP official stressed the
relevance of the rule of law in their NCP's work, especially when explaining the

145. Compare UK NCP, PSA Peugeot, supranote 140; UK NCP, Afrimex, supra note 109; UK NCP,
Vedanta Resources, supra note 109; Dutch NCP, Shell, supra note 136; and Report of the National
Contact Point of Chile on the Case of Marine Harvest, Nov. 6, 2003, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/13/32429072.pdf; In terms of a clear, structured, and convincing
kind of reasoning see also Statement by the Norwegian National Contact Point, Enquiry on Aker
Kva-rer's activities at Guantanamo Bay, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/5/48/38038283.pdf. However, the last case was very debated in terms of the jurisdiction of
the Norwegian NCP.
146. Telephone interview with Swiss NCP (Mar. 3, 2011).
147. This expression was used in a phone interview with the Dutch NCP on the part of an NCP official (while stating that this legalistic approach and the handling of the CSR disputes is a "tough" task).
The handwriting of some statements is that of lawyers. Telephone interview with Dutch NCP (Mar. 17,
2011) and telephone interview with UK NCP (Mar. 4, 2011). Both interviewees confirmed that in their
NCPs the people handling specific instances have accomplished a legal formation.
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practice of examining corporate behavior, the reasoning of the examinations, and
their publications.148
It is also important to note that examining corporate behavior is different than
adjudication. These two actions are blurred at times and create confusion when the
NCPs deal with parallel proceedings, for example. Parallel proceedings occur
when a business conduct of a specific instance is already the subject of other proceedings at the sub-national, national, or international levels.149 If the Guidelines
regulate CSR in a different way than a legal norm of corporate responsibility, their
implementation procedure must be different than a legal procedure. Accordingly,
50
parallel legal proceedings should not affect the handling of specific instances.1
Hence, this debated question also exemplifies the NCPs' insecurities and confusion with regard to the commitment and implementation of the Guidelines.
The debate among NCPs about whether examining corporate compliance with
the Guidelines reflects core debates about soft law in general and the nature of
CSR norms in particular. The core dispute in the CSR debate is whether these
standards are - or ought to be - mandatory and/or legally enforceable. In the soft
law debate, the core dispute is whether soft law initiatives constitute "law" - usually where "law" is understood to mean only legally enforceable norms. As in
these broader debates, the dispute about the propriety of the NCPs engaging in
examinations is in principle misleading, not only because of an overly formalistic
understanding of "law," but also because of the assumption that a choice of implementation is limited to either pure enforcement or pure collaboration. But in
CSR disputes - as seen in this study -a purely collaborative approach on the part
of NCPs may prove ineffective, particularly in cases where one party refuses to
participate in the procedure. Instead of focusing on whether the examination process is formally compatible with the legal character of the Guidelines, states should
rather focus on how to promote compliance with the norms they have agreed
upon. In terms of the Guidelines, forty-two governments have agreed upon the
establishment of these CSR standards due to the public interest of their societies in
social responsible business operations worldwide. And these governments have
obliged themselves, through legally binding norms, to conduct a dispute resolution
process intended to promote compliance with the Guidelines. In order to promote
compliance, an examination can be necessary under certain conditions, and should
then be carried out in a professional way based on sufficient information and
comprehensible reasoning.
V. CONCLUSION: 2011 UPDATE OF THE GUIDELINES AND FORECAST

This article reveals considerable variations of interpretations and applications
of the Guidelines, their implementation, and their compliance. The different understandings of this soft law initiative are reflected in the parties' different approaches to this procedure, especially those of the NCPs. Located in the "twilight
148. Telephone interview with UK NCP (Mar. 4, 2011). The Dutch NCP official also mentioned the
interest of the parliament and to which the NCP has to respond.
149. See supra note 118 with further reference to this debate among the NCPs.
150. This consequent position is given on the part of the Dutch NCP. Telephone interview with Dutch
NCP (March 17th, 2011) and interview with Dr. Rainer Geiger, OECD official, in Washington D.C.
(Mar. 23, 2011).
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of law and politics,"15 ' the soft law nature of the Guidelines shifts the choice of
appropriate implementation to the NCPs. And the NCPs are divided in their opinions on whether to evaluate and determine a noncompliance with the Guidelines.
The flexibility of soft law that makes it sometimes more preferable to states than
treaties1 52 leads to a broader range of interpretations and applications. Consequently, this becomes more visible in an institutionalized multilateral grievance
mechanism.
This flexibility has its upsides and its downsides, however. On the one hand,
it causes confusion for participants inside and outside of the procedure, and this
confusion may diminish its impact. On the other hand, this flexibility allows the
participants to try out their own approaches and this is in principle, a creative and
dynamic process, which could be beneficial in terms of elaborating a dispute
mechanism for a relatively new field like CSR. Further, the multifaceted characteristics of the CSR disputes handled by the NCPs require the adaptability to the
various kinds of parties and issues. After more than a decade of practice, however,
the main problem of this dispute resolution mechanism is evident: the lack of
transparency due to the variations and limited practice of publishing final statements with sufficient information to help the public understand the CSR issue and
the assessment of the NCP.
The NCPs are aware of this issue. In the 2011 updated version of the Guidelines-which is by no means comparable to the comprehensive review of the year
2000-the aspect of publishing statements was reinforced.15 1 Now, initial assessments-which the NCPs do not regard as meriting further consideration- require
publication and the "statement should at a minimum describe the issues raised and
the reasons for the NCP's decision.' 154 However, because NCPs must continue to
take into account "the need to protect sensitive business and other stakeholder
information," the general public must wait to see whether there will be a change in
the NCPs' practice.
Furthermore, it is clear that the main challenge of this dispute system is
achieving the cooperation of the participants. In order to increase the interest and
willingness to participate in the collaborative implementation mechanism of the
Guidelines, the NCPs have to communicate to the participants that cooperation is
in the interest of all parties. In order to achieve this interest, the parties must believe that the NCPs' procedure is fair and transparent. In the end, it is necessary to
understand that this dispute system can lead to different kinds of valuable outcomes like clarification, information exchange with the other party, an agreement,
and eventually the change of a corporate practice.
The specific instances procedure is still in a testing phase. The NCPs have to
enhance the trust and respect in this unique dispute resolution mechanism-which
is a promising one that has proven in several specific instances that it can advance
CSR.

151.
152.
153.
154.

See Schachter, supra note 47.
See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 52.
See Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 1.
Id.
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